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We extend the field of continuous-variable quantum cryptography to a network formulation where
two honest parties connect to an untrusted relay by insecure quantum links. To generate secret
correlations, they transmit coherent states to the relay where a continuous-variable Bell detection
is performed and the outcome broadcast. Even though the detection could be fully corrupted and
the links subject to optimal coherent attacks, the honest parties can still extract a secret key,
achieving high rates when the relay is proximal to one party, as typical in public networks with
access points or proxy servers. Our theory is confirmed by an experiment generating key-rates
which are orders of magnitude higher than those achievable with discrete-variable protocols. Thus,
using the cheapest possible quantum resources, we experimentally show the possibility of high-rate
quantum key distribution in network topologies where direct links are missing between end-users
and intermediate relays cannot be trusted.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is one of the
most active areas in quantum information [3, 4], with a
number of in-field implementations, including the devel-
opment of metropolitan networks based on point-to-point
QKD protocols [5–8]. A typical QKD protocol involves
two parties, conventionally called Alice and Bob, who
aim to generate a secret key by exchanging quantum sys-
tems over an insecure communication channel. Security
is assessed against the most powerful attack on the chan-
nel, where an eavesdropper, conventionally called Eve,
perturbs the quantum systems using the most general
strategies allowed by quantum mechanics.
While this theoretical analysis is fundamental for test-
ing the basic security of a protocol, it may be insuffi-
cient to guarantee its viability in realistic implementa-
tions, where flaws in the devices may provide alternative
‘side-channels’ to be attacked [9, 10]. These weaknesses
naturally arise in realistic models of networks (e.g., the
Internet) where two end-users are not connected by direct
lines but must exploit one or more intermediate nodes,
whose operation may be tampered with by Eve.
In this scenario, Ref. [11] has recently introduced a gen-
eral method to guarantee security. Considering arbitrary
quantum systems as information carriers, Ref. [11] de-
signed a swapping-like protocol where secret correlations
are established by the measurement of a third untrusted
party. This idea of ‘measurement-device independence’
has been independently introduced in Ref. [12] in the
specific context of qubits (weak pulses and decoy states),
with a series of further investigations [14–22].
In this paper we develop the notion of measurement-
device independence for bosonic systems. In this way we
extend the field of continuous-variable quantum cryptog-
raphy [4, 23–27] to a more robust network formulation.
In fact, we consider the basic network topology where Al-
ice and Bob communicate by connecting to an untrusted
relay via insecure links. To create secret correlations,
they transmit random coherent states to the relay where
a continuous-variable Bell detection is performed and the
outcome broadcast. Despite the possibility that the re-
lay could be fully tampered with, and the links subject
to optimal coherent attacks, Alice and Bob are still able
to extract a secret key.
Our analysis shows that the optimal configuration of
the protocol corresponds to the relay being close to one
party, e.g., Alice, in which case remarkable rates can be
achieved, orders of magnitude higher than those achiev-
able with discrete-variable protocols over comparable dis-
tances [12, 20–22]. Our theoretical prediction is fully con-
firmed by a proof-of-principle experiment, where 10−2
secret bits per relay use are distributed at 10dB loss in
Bob’s link, equivalent to 50km in standard optical fibre
(at the loss rate of 0.2dB/km). Such rate corresponds to
hundreds of kbits/s using state-of-the-art clock rates at
75MHz [22]. Furthermore, assuming ideal reconciliation,
our experiment shows a potential rate of about 10−4 se-
cret bits per relay use over a very lossy link, with 34dB
loss corresponding to 170km in fibre.
Note that this asymmetric configuration resembles the
typical topology of a public network where a user con-
nects its device to a proxy server to communicate with
remote users. This setup is here studied in the full op-
tical regime but may also occur in a mixed technology
environment where a wireless device (e.g., the infrared
port of a laptop or phone) connects to a nearby access
point, which is the hub of a star network of remote users
connected by long optical fibres.
We remark that our formulation provides conceptual
and practical advantages with respect to traditional
quantum cryptography. First we move from a point-to-
point to a robust end-to-end formulation, which removes
both trust and complexity from the middle nodes. In
particular, the fact that the relay is just performing a
simple detection on the incoming systems removes ex-
2pensive quantum sources from the network. This feature
makes the key rate orders of magnitude higher than that
of protocols based on a central distribution of entangle-
ment [28, 29]. Second we fully exploit the advantages
provided by continuous variables using the cheapest pos-
sible quantum sources (coherent states) and the most
efficient quantum measurements (homodyne detectors).
This other feature makes our protocol easy to implement
on realistic networks with key rates out of the reach of
any protocol based on discrete-variable systems.
Thus, our work exploits the cheapest quantum re-
sources to prove high-rate QKD in untrusted networks
where direct links are missing between two end-users.
This represents the first step towards the realization of
scalable models of secure quantum networks, based on
the end-to-end principle [30] and the modern notion of
‘reliability from unreliable parts’ [31].
I. RESULTS
For simplicity, we start by describing the protocol in
noiseless links, explaining the basic mechanism of the re-
lay. Then we consider the most general eavesdropping
strategy against the relay and the links, showing how
this strategy can be reduced to a coherent Gaussian at-
tack of the links only. Finally we derive the secret-key
rate of the protocol and we compare theoretical and ex-
perimental performances in the optimal configuration.
Basic idea.– Consider two distant parties, Alice and
Bob, aiming to share a secret key. At one side, Alice pre-
pares a mode A in a coherent state |α〉 whose amplitude α
is modulated by a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and large variance, equal to ϕ ≫ 1 in each quadrature.
At the other side, Bob prepares his mode B in another
coherent state |β〉 whose amplitude β is modulated by
the same Gaussian distribution as Alice. Modes A and
B are then sent to an intermediate station, which is the
continuous-variable Bell relay shown in Fig. 1(i).
The relay performs a continuous-variable Bell detec-
tion on the incoming modes, by mixing them in a bal-
anced beam splitter whose output ports are conjugately
homodyned [32]. This detection corresponds to measur-
ing the quadrature operators qˆ− = (qˆA − qˆB)/
√
2 and
pˆ+ = (pˆA + pˆB)/
√
2, whose classical outcomes are com-
bined in a complex variable γ := (q− + ip+)/
√
2 with
probability p(γ). The outcome γ is then communicated
to Alice and Bob via a classical public channel.
In this process the relay acts as a correlator [11]. One
can check that the outcome γ creates a-posteriori corre-
lations between the parties, being equal to γ = α−β∗+ δˆ
with δˆ detection noise. As a result, the knowledge of γ
enables each party to infer the variable of the other party
by simple postprocessing. For instance, Bob may com-
pute β∗+ γ = α+ δˆ decoding Alice’s variable [33]. Thus,
conditioned on γ, Alice and Bob’s mutual information
increases from I(α : β) = 0 to I(α : β|γ) > 0.
FIG. 1: (i) Modus operandi of the continuous-variable Bell
relay (see text for explanation). (ii) Joint attack of the proto-
col. In each use of the relay, modes A and B unitarily interact
with ancillary vacuum modes. Two outputs simulate the re-
lay, while the remaining outputs E are stored in a quantum
memory (QM) measured by Eve at the end of the protocol.
Averaging over all possible outputs γ, the honest par-
ties will share IAB =
∫
d2γp(γ)I(α : β|γ) mean bits per
use of the relay, which is logarithmically increasing in
the modulation ϕ. Despite Eve also having access to
the classical communication and operating the relay, she
cannot steal any information, since she only knows γ and
I(α : γ) = I(β : γ) = 0. As a result, Eve is forced to
attack the links and/or corrupt the relay.
Protocol under general eavesdropping.– The
most general eavesdropping strategy of our protocol is
a joint attack involving both the relay and the two links
as depicted in Fig. 1(ii). In each use of the relay, Eve
may intercept the two modes, A and B, and make them
interact with an ensemble of ancillary vacuum modes via
a general unitary U . Among the output modes, two are
sent to a simulator of the relay, where they are homo-
dyned and the result γ broadcast. The remaining modes
E are stored in a quantum memory which is measured at
the end of the protocol.
Note that a more general attack may involve a uni-
tary applied to all modes which are transmitted over
many uses of the relay. However, this can always be
reduced to the previous attack, coherent within the sin-
gle use, by assuming that Alice and Bob perform random
permutations on their data [34, 35]. Also note that, in
Eve’s simulator, any other higher-rank measurement of
the quadratures can always be purified into a rank-one
measurement by enlarging the set of the ancillas E. If
other observables are measured or no detection occurs,
the communication of a fake variable γ can be easily de-
tected from the analysis of the empirical data [11].
3In order to deal with the joint attack of Fig. 1(ii), Alice
and Bob must retrieve the joint statistics of the variables
α, β, and γ. Since the protocol is performed many times,
Alice and Bob can compare a small part of their data
via the public channel and reconstruct the probability
distribution p(α, β, γ). As we show in the Supplementary
Information, for any observed distribution p(α, β, γ), the
security of the protocol does not change if we modify
Eve’s unitary U in such a way that her simulator works
exactly as the original relay (so that the modes are mixed
in a balanced beam splitter and conjugately homodyned).
Thus, we can assume that the relay is properly operated
(even if by Eve) with the unitary U restricted to be a
coherent attack against the two links.
The description of this attack can further be simplified.
Since the protocol is based on the Gaussian modulation
and detection of Gaussian states, its optimal eavesdrop-
ping is based on a Gaussian unitary U [36]. Thus, from
the first- and second-order statistical moments of the ob-
served distribution p(α, β, γ), Alice and Bob construct
a Gaussian distribution pG(α, β, γ) and design a corre-
sponding optimal Gaussian attack against the links.
From an operational point of view, the first-order mo-
ments are used to construct the optimal estimators of
each other variable, while the second-order moments are
used to derive the secret key rate of the protocol. In par-
ticular, Alice and Bob are able to compute their mutual
information IAB and upperbound Eve’s stolen informa-
tion IE via the Holevo bound. As long as the condition
R := IAB−IE > 0 is satisfied, they can postprocess their
data via standard procedures of error correction and pri-
vacy amplification, and distill an average of R secret bits
per use of the relay.
Coherent Gaussian attack of the links.– Following
the previous reasoning, the cryptoanalysis of the protocol
can be reduced to studying a coherent Gaussian attack
against the two links, assuming a properly-working relay.
Attacks of this kind can be constructed by correlating
two canonical forms [37, 38]. The most realistic scenario
is the Gaussian attack depicted in Fig. 2.
Alice Bob
A B| |

Relay
QM
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FIG. 2: Protocol in the presence of a coherent Gaussian at-
tack. The two travelling modes, A and B, are mixed with
two ancillary modes, E1 and E2, via two beam splitters, with
transmissivities τA and τB, which introduce thermal noise
with variances, ωA and ωB , respectively. The ancillary modes
belong to a reservoir of ancillas (E1, e, E2) which is globally
in a pure Gaussian state. All Eve’s output is stored in a
quantum memory (QM) measured at the end of the protocol.
In this attack, the two travelling modes, A and B, are
mixed with two ancillary modes, E1 and E2, by two beam
splitters with transmissivities τA and τB , respectively.
These ancillary modes belong to a reservoir of ancillas
(E1, E2 plus an extra set e) which is globally described
by a pure Gaussian state. The reduced state σE1E2 of the
injected ancillas is a correlated thermal state with zero
mean and covariance matrix in the normal form
VE1E2 =
(
ωAI G
G ωBI
)
, G :=
(
g 0
0 g′
)
, (1)
where ωA, ωB ≥ 1 are the variances of the thermal noise
affecting each link, while g and g′ are correlation param-
eters which must satisfy physical constraints [39, 40] (see
Supplementary Information). After interaction, all Eve’s
ancillas are stored in a quantum memory, which is coher-
ently measured at the end of the protocol.
Note that our description of the attack is very gen-
eral since any two-mode Gaussian state can be trans-
formed into the previous normal form by local Gaussian
unitaries [4]. In general, the injected state σE1E2 can be
separable or entangled. The simplest case is when there
are no correlations (g = g′ = 0), so that σE1E2 is a tensor
product and the attack collapses into a collective attack
with two independent entangling cloners [24].
Secret-key rate of the protocol.– In the attack of
Fig. 2, the relay provides γ =
√
τAα − √τBβ∗ + δˆnoise,
where the empirical values of τA and τB are accessible
to the parties from the first-order moments of the statis-
tics p(α, β, γ). We assume that Alice is the encoder and
Bob is the decoder, which means that α is inferred by
processing β into an optimal estimator. For large mod-
ulation ϕ ≫ 1, Alice and Bob’s mutual information is
given by IAB = log2(ϕ/χ), where the equivalent noise
χ = χ(τA, τB, ωA, ωB, g, g
′) can be computed from the
second-order moments of p(α, β, γ) (see Supplementary
Information for more details).
From the analysis of the second-order statistical mo-
ments, Alice and Bob can derive the secret-key rate of
the protocol, which becomes a simple function of τA, τB
and χ in the limit of large modulation
R(τA, τB , χ) = h
(
τAχ
τA+τB
− 1
)
− h
[
τAτBχ−(τA+τB)2
|τA−τB|(τA+τB)
]
+ log2
[
2(τA+τB)
e|τA−τB|χ
]
, (2)
where h(x) := x+12 log2
x+1
2 − x−12 log2 x−12 . The asymp-
totic rate is continuous in τA = τB , where it becomes
R(χ) = h
(
χ
2 − 1
)
+ log2
[
16
e2χ(χ−4)
]
. (3)
As typical in QKD, the equivalent noise can be decom-
posed as χ = χloss + ε, where χloss = 2(τA + τB)/τAτB is
the noise due to loss, while ε is the ‘excess noise’. Thus,
the key rate can be also expressed as R = R(τA, τB , ε).
To study the maximum theoretical performance of the
protocol we set ε = 0, therefore restricting Eve to a
4pure-loss attack of the links with rate Rloss(τA, τB) :=
R(τA, τB , 0). In the symmetric configuration τA = τB :=
τ , we find Rloss(τ, τ) ≃ 0 at τ ≃ 0.84, so that Alice’s
and Bob’s distances from a perfectly-in-the-middle re-
lay are limited to ≃3.8km in standard telecom fibres
(0.2dB/km). For this reason, we consider asymmetric
configurations where one of the links has small loss.
First suppose that Bob’s link has small loss (τB ≃ 1).
We find Rloss ≃ log2[τA/(1− τA)e] which is zero at τA ≃
0.73. In telecom fibres this is still restrictive, since Alice’s
distance from the relay cannot exceed 6.8km. By con-
trast, suppose that Alice’s link has small loss (τA ≃ 1).
Now we have Rloss ≃ h[(2−τB)/τB]+ log2[τB/(1−τB)e],
which goes to zero only for τB → 0, corresponding to
Bob arbitrarily far from the relay. Thus, we find that
extremely long distances can be achieved if the relay is
sufficiently close to Alice [41]. These distances are fully
quantified in the next section.
Long distance distribution via proximal relays.–
Consider the asymmetric scenario in Fig. 3, where Alice
and Bob exploit an untrusted relay at some short ra-
dial distance r from Alice and distance d from Bob. For
pure-loss links (ε = 0) and standard fibres (0.2dB/km),
we can express the rate as Rloss = Rloss(r, d). Solving
Rloss = 0 we derive the security threshold in terms of
Bob’s maximum distance d for a given value of r.
Bob
B
distance d
Alice
Relay
A
FIG. 3: Key-distribution via a proximal untrusted relay, at
short radial distance r from Alice, and distant d from Bob.
As we see from Fig. 4, for a relay sufficiently close to
Alice, Bob can be very far with key distribution being
possible at distances well beyond 100km. This perfor-
mance is very robust to the presence of excess noise ε 6= 0,
coming from a coherent Gaussian attack of the links. In
this general case, we can write the rate as R = R(r, d, ε).
Then, solving R = 0 for high excess noise ε = 0.1 [42] we
derive the threshold in the inset of Fig. 4. As a result,
key distribution is possible at very long distances even in
the presence of very strong eavesdropping.
Experimental proof-of-principle.– Our theory has
been experimentally confirmed. We have reproduced the
asymmetric configuration of Fig. 3, with τA ≃ 1 and vari-
able τB, down to 4×10−4 corresponding to about 170km
in standard optical fibre. A schematic of our experimen-
tal setup is depicted in Fig. 5 .
For every experimental point, we have evaluated the
second-order moments of p(α, β, γ) and computed the
experimental key rate R = ξIAB − IE , with ξ ≤ 1 be-
ing the reconciliation efficiency (current achievable value
ξ ≃ 0.97 [43]). Experimental results are plotted in Fig. 6
and compared with the theoretical predictions, with ex-
cellent agreement. Assuming ideal reconciliation, the ex-
perimental rate approaches the theoretical limit of the
0 1 2 3 4 5
1
10
100
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
50
100
150
200
r (km)
Max distanceR>0
r
d
d
 (
k
m
)
FIG. 4: Given a relay at distance r from Alice, the solid line
represents the maximum distance d of Bob from this relay,
within which key distribution is possible (R > 0). The inset
shows Bob’s maximum distance (in logarithmic scale) when
Eve performs a coherent Gaussian attack with excess noise
ε = 0.1 (dashed line). The corresponding security threshold
is compared with that of the pure-loss attack (solid line).
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Untrusted Relay
EOM EOM
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EOM: Electro-Optical Modulator
 PBS: Polarizing Beam Splitter
   PD: Photo Detector
DAQ: Data Acquisition
RNG: Random Number Generator
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FIG. 5: Experimental setup. Alice and Bob apply amplitude
and phase modulators to a pair of identical classical phase-
locked bright coherent beams (providing a common local os-
cillator). At the output, the two modes emerge randomly-
displaced in the phase space according to a Gaussian dis-
tribution. In particular, Bob’s modulation is suitably at-
tenuated to simulate loss in his link. At the relay, modes
are mixed in a balanced beam splitter and the output ports
photo-detected. Photocurrents are then processed to realize
a continuous-variable Bell measurement (see Supplementary
Information for more details).
pure-loss attack. Due to imperfections, we have extra
noise in our data which affects the rate approximately
in the same way as a coherent Gaussian attack with ex-
cess noise ε . 0.02. Note that we can potentially reach
R ≃ 10−4 secret bits per relay use over a link with 34dB
loss, equivalent to 170km in standard optical fibre.
Such long distance results are only potential since the
current reconciliation procedures for continuous-variable
protocols do not have unit efficiency (indeed this is the
5main factor limiting the distance of continuous variable
QKD). By taking this realistic limitation into account
(ξ ≃ 0.97), we can still reach remarkably high rates over
distances well beyond the typical connection lengths of
a network. As we can see from Fig. 6, we can achieve
R ≃ 10−2 secret bits per relay use over a link with 10dB
loss, equivalent to 50km in fibre.
This result is at least three orders of magnitude higher
than that achievable with discrete-variables over compa-
rable distances [12, 20–22]. Implementing our protocol
with a 75MHz clock rate [22] would provide a secret-key
rate in the range 75 ÷ 750kbit/s at 50 ÷ 60km, which is
remarkably higher than the value . 100bit/s reported in
[22] over similar distances. At the same time, we achieve
the best performances of continuous variable protocols
despite the fact we are removing their point-to-point
quantum communication channel. For instance, work-
ing with a 1MHz clock rate at 50 ÷ 60km, we can reach
a rate of about 1÷ 10kbit/s as in Ref. [27].
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FIG. 6: Secret-key rate R versus Bob’s distance d from
the relay. Experimental points refer to ideal reconciliation
(ξ = 1, red circles) and realistic reconciliation (ξ ≃ 0.97, blue
squares). For comparison, we also plot the theoretical rates
for a pure-loss attack (solid line) and a coherent Gaussian
attack with excess noise ε = 0.02 (dashed line).
II. DISCUSSION
In this work, we have extended the field of continuous-
variable quantum cryptography to a network formula-
tion where two end-users do not access a direct quantum
communication channel but are forced to connect to an
untrusted relay via insecure quantum links. Despite the
possibility that the relay could be fully corrupted and its
links subject to coherent attacks, the end-users can still
extract a secret key. This surprising result comes from a
demanding cryptoanalysis of our model which represents
the first continuous-variable protocol whose rate has been
explicitly computed against a two-mode coherent attack.
An important feature is the simplicity of the relay,
which does not possess any quantum source but just per-
forms a standard optical measurement, with all the heavy
procedures of data post-processing left to the end-users,
fulfilling the idea behind the end-to-end principle. In par-
ticular, the relay implements a continuous-variable Bell
detection which involves highly efficient photodetectors
plus linear optics, whereas the discrete-variable version
of this measurement needs nonlinear elements to operate
deterministically. This feature combined with the use of
coherent states makes the scheme very attractive, guar-
anteeing both cheap implementation and high rates.
We have found that the optimal network configura-
tion is asymmetric with the untrusted relay acting as a
proxy server near to one of the parties. In this case we
have experimentally proven that remarkable rates can be
reached, several orders of magnitude higher than those
achievable with qubit-based protocols over comparable
distances. Further improvements in the classical recon-
ciliation techniques would make the performance of our
protocol even better. From this point of view, our proto-
col can already be used for setting up very efficient star
networks based on public access points. Further inves-
tigations could involve the analysis of mixed technology
environments where some of the connections are estab-
lished at low frequencies (infrared or microwave) with
thermal effects becoming important [44–46].
By introducing the mediation of an untrusted and
cheap relay, our work paves the way for extending quan-
tum cryptography to more advanced models of networks
where information is routed end-to-end through un-
trusted nodes, whereas current models are strongly based
on computationally demanding point-to-point sessions of
key distribution involving chains of trusted nodes [5–8].
Indeed our protocol can already be used to remove trust
and reliability from half of the nodes of a large network,
since any chain of nodes between two end-users can be
decomposed into n+1 trusted nodes and n untrusted re-
lays (so that only n temporary keys must be distributed
along the chain, instead of 2n point-to-point keys). It
is clear that further work is needed to extend the model
and realize a fully untrusted network where only the end-
users are trusted.
III. METHODS
Theoretical methods, experimental details and data
analysis can be found in the Supplementary Information.
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Supplementary Information
Contents of the document. In Sec. I we give full
details of our theoretical methods and derivations. We
follow the notation of Ref. [S1], where [qˆ, pˆ] = 2i (i.e., ℏ =
2) so that the vacuum noise is set to 1 and aˆ = (qˆ+ipˆ)/2.
In Sec. II we thoroughly discuss the experimental setup
and the post-processing of the data, including an analysis
of the various finite-size effects.
I. THEORETICAL METHODS
In this section we describe the main theoretical meth-
ods used in our study. Adopting an entanglement-
based representation of the protocol (Sec. I A), we first
show how a joint attack of the relay and the links can
be reduced to a Gaussian attack of the links with a
properly-working relay (Sec. I B). Here the key-step is
proving the measurement-device independence for our
continuous-variable protocol, followed by the application
of the known result on the extremality of Gaussian states.
In Sec. I C, we then describe how to derive the secret-
key rate of the protocol in the presence of an arbitrary
Gaussian attack of the links. In Sec. ID we make our
derivation more specific considering a realistic form of a
coherent Gaussian attack, deriving an explicit analytical
formula for the secret-key rate in Sec. I E. This rate is
minimized and simplified in Sec. I F, and studied for spe-
cific configurations in Sec. IG. Finally, Sec. I H contains
the technical derivation of the post-relay quantum covari-
ance matrix (CM) which is central for the computation
of the rate.
A. Cryptoanalysis of the protocol in the
entanglement-based representation
To study the security of the protocol, we adopt an
entanglement-based representation where each source of
coherent states is realized by an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) state subject to heterodyne detection. As in the
top panel of Fig. 7, at Alice’s station we take an EPR
state ρaA having zero mean and CM equal to
V =
(
µI
√
µ2 − 1Z√
µ2 − 1Z µI
)
, Z :=
(
1
−1
)
. (4)
By heterodyning mode a, Alice remotely prepares a
coherent state |α〉 on mode A, whose amplitude is mod-
ulated by a complex Gaussian with variance ϕ = µ − 1.
The outcome of the measurement α˜ is related to the pro-
jected amplitude α by the relation
α˜ = ηα∗, η := (µ+ 1)(µ2 − 1)−1/2. (5)
For large modulation µ ≫ 1 we have α˜ ≃ α∗. It is
important to note that the two variables α and α˜ are
equivalent from a information-theoretical point of view,
in the sense that they share the same mutual information
with any third variable.
On the other side, Bob’s coherent state |β〉 can be pre-
pared using another EPR state ρbB whose mode b is het-
erodyned with outcome β˜ = ηβ∗ (with the limit β˜ ≃ β∗
for µ≫ 1). Again, we have that the outcome variable β˜
is informationally equivalent to β.
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FIG. 7: (Top). Entanglement-based representation of the pro-
tocol, where Alice’s and Bob’s random coherent states are
generated by local heterodyne detections on EPR states. Out-
come variables α˜ and β˜ are informationally-equivalent to the
amplitudes α and β of the coherent states. (Bottom) Condi-
tional scenario after Eve’s detection with outcome γ.
In the top panel of Fig. 7 we see that, before the uni-
tary U and the measurements, the global input state of
Alice, Bob, and Eve is pure and Gaussian (Eve’s ancillas
are prepared in vacua). After U and before the mea-
surements, their global output state is still pure, despite
the fact that it could be non-Gaussian. Since local mea-
surements commute, we can postpone Alice’s and Bob’s
heterodyne detections after Eve’s detection, whose out-
come γ is obtained with probability p(γ). Thus, we have
the conditional scenario depicted in the bottom panel
of Fig. 7, where Alice, Bob, and Eve share a conditional
8state ΦabE|γ with reduced states ρab|γ (for Alice and Bob)
and ρE|γ (for Eve). Since Eve performs homodyne detec-
tions, ΦabE|γ is pure, so that ρab|γ and ρE|γ have the same
entropy
S(ρab|γ) = S(ρE|γ). (6)
In the conditional post-relay scheme of Fig. 7 (bottom
panel), Alice encodes information by heterodyning her
mode a with result α˜. Since heterodyne is a rank-one
measurement, it projects ΦabE|γ into a pure state ΦbE|γα˜
for Bob and Eve, so that the reduced states ρb|γα˜ and
ρE|γα˜ have the same entropy
S(ρb|γα˜) = S(ρE|γα˜). (7)
As a result we have that, conditioned on γ, Eve’s stolen
information on Alice’s variable α˜ is upperbounded by the
Holevo quantity
IE|γ := S(ρE|γ)− S(ρE|γα˜) = S(ρab|γ)− S(ρb|γα˜), (8)
which is fully determined by the state ρab|γ .
To retrieve Alice’s encoding α˜, Bob heterodynes his
mode b whose output β˜ is optimally postprocessed. Con-
ditioned on γ, Alice and Bob’s mutual information is
given by IAB|γ := I(α˜, β˜|γ) = I(α, β|γ), which is fully
determined by ρab|γ . As a result, the secret-key rate of
the protocol is given by the average
R =
∫
d2γ p(γ)R|γ , R|γ := IAB|γ − IE|γ . (9)
This quantity only depends on the conditional state ρab|γ
and the statistics of Eve’s outcomes p(γ).
B. Measurement-device independence and
Gaussian optimality
Starting from the observed distribution p(α, β, γ) =
p(α, β|γ)p(γ), Alice and Bob reconstruct a joint attack
as in the top panel of Fig. 7, which is optimal and com-
patible with their statistics. In particular, they compute
the post-relay conditional state ρab|γ directly from the
conditional probability p(α, β|γ).
Given p(α, β, γ), and therefore p(γ) and ρab|γ , the rate
R is completely determined. This means that R remains
exactly the same if we arbitrarily change U while pre-
serving the observed statistics p(α, β, γ). In particular,
we can change U in such a way that the simulator repre-
sents a properly-working relay. This can always be done
by adding the identity I = UBellU
†
Bell, where U
†
Bell is ab-
sorbed by U , while UBell converts the homodynes of the
simulator into a Bell detection. Thus, compatibly with
the observed data, an arbitrary joint attack U of the links
and the relay can always be reduced to an attack of the
links only, associated with a properly-working relay.
The next step is exploiting the optimality of Gaussian
attacks for Gaussian protocols [S1, S2]. For any outcome
γ, the conditional rate R|γ is minimized if we replace the
pure state ΦabE|γ with a pure Gaussian state ΦGabE|γ hav-
ing the same mean value and CM. Note that, in the top
panel of Fig. 7, this is equivalent to considering U to be
a Gaussian unitary, therefore generating joint Gaussian
statistics for the variables α, β and γ. Thus, Alice and
Bob can always replace p(α, β, γ) with a Gaussian dis-
tribution pG(α, β, γ) having the same first- and second-
order statistical moments. Adopting this new distribu-
tion, they upperbound Eve’s performance replacing her
attack with a Gaussian attack against the links.
C. General computation of the secret-key rate
According to the previous analysis, Alice and Bob con-
sider the worst-case scenario where the two links are sub-
ject to a Gaussian attack, while the relay is properly op-
erated by Eve. In this case, for any outcome γ, the con-
ditional Gaussian state ρab|γ has always the same CM
Vab|γ while its mean value varies with γ. As typical in
Gaussian entanglement swapping [S3], this random shift
in the first moments can be automatically compensated
for by Bob’s postprocessing.
As a result we have that IAB|γ depends only on the
invariant CM Vab|γ , so that we can write
IAB = IAB|γ (10)
for any γ. Similarly, the entropies in Eq. (8) depends
only on the invariant CM Vab|γ , so that
IE = IE|γ (11)
for any γ. As a result, the conditional rate R|γ is invari-
ant and coincides with the actual (average) rate of the
protocol, i.e., R = R|γ for any γ. Equivalently, we may
write
R = IAB − IE . (12)
Thus, we can theoretically compute the rate R from the
quantum CM Vab|γ of the post-relay state ρab|γ .
Now it is important to note that this CM can always
be determined by the parties during the data compari-
son at the end of the protocol. In particular, it can be
derived from the second-order statistical moments of the
observed data. In fact, from the empirical distribution
p(α, β, γ) or its Gaussian version pG(α, β, γ), Alice and
Bob derive the relation matrix Γ(α, β, γ) and the com-
plex CM V(α, β, γ) [S4]. Setting α = (qA + ipA)/2 and
β = (qB + ipB)/2, these matrices are equivalent to a real
CM for the quadratures
V(qA, pA, qB , pB, q−, p+) =
(
VA⊕B C
CT R
)
, (13)
whereVA⊕B := V(qA, pA)⊕V(qB, pB) is Alice and Bob’s
reduced CM, R is the CM of the outcomes at the relay,
9and C accounts for the correlations. Given the outcome
γ, the conditional CM of Alice and Bob can be computed
by Gaussian elimination and reads
V(qA, pA, qB, pB|γ) = VA⊕B −CR−1CT . (14)
In the entanglement-based representation of the proto-
col, we can easily put the previous CM in terms of Alice’s
and Bob’s measurement outcomes, respectively,
α˜ = (q˜A + ip˜A)/2, β˜ = (q˜B + ip˜B)/2. (15)
In fact, we can write
V(qA, pA, qB, pB|γ) = η−2V(q˜A, p˜A, q˜B, p˜B|γ), (16)
where parameter η is defined in Eq. (5) and accounts
for the fact that the modulation is finite. Finally, the
connection with the quantum CM is given by
V(q˜A, p˜A, q˜B, p˜B|γ) = Vab|γ + I, (17)
where I is the vacuum shot-noise introduced by the het-
erodyne detections. The latter relation can be derived
modelling each heterodyne detector as a quantum-limited
amplifier (with gain 2) followed by a balanced beam split-
ter (with vacuum environment) which is conjugately ho-
modyned at the output ports (one in the position and
the other in the momentum quadrature).
Note that for the specific computation of the condi-
tional entropy of Eq. (7), which enters in Eve’s Holevo
information and therefore the rate, one has to derive the
conditional quantum CM Vb|γα˜ of Bob’s state ρb|γα˜ af-
ter Alice’s heterodyne detection with outcome α˜. For
this calculation, we write Vab|γ in the block form
Vab|γ =
(
a c
cT b
)
, (18)
and we apply the formula [S1]
Vb|γα˜ = b− cT (a+ I)−1c, (19)
or equivalently [S5]
Vb|γα˜ = b− ζ−1cT (ΩaΩT + I)c, (20)
where ζ is defined in terms of trace and determinant as
ζ := det(a) + Tr(a) + 1, and
Ω =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (21)
Alternatively, we may compute
Vb|γα˜ = V(q˜B , p˜B|γα˜)− I, (22)
where V(q˜B , p˜B|γα˜) comes from V(q˜A, p˜A, q˜B, p˜B|γ) af-
ter Gaussian elimination of Alice’s outcome variables.
To derive an explicit formula for the secret-key rate,
we consider a realistic form for the coherent Gaussian
attack. The mathematical details of this attack are fully
discussed in the next section. Then, in Sec. I E we will
explicitly compute the analytical expression of the rate.
D. Realistic Gaussian attack against the links
Consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 8, which is the
entanglement-based representation of our protocol sub-
ject to a realistic Gaussian attack against the two links.
This two-mode Gaussian attack is characterized by two
beam splitters with transmissivities τA (for Alice’s link)
and τB (for Bob’s link). Using these beam splitters, Eve
mixes the incoming modes, A and B, with two ancillary
modes, E1 and E2, extracted from a reservoir of ancillas.
After the beam splitters, the output ancillas, E′1 and E
′
2,
are stored in a quantum memory (together with all the
other ancillas in the reservoir).
Alice
a
ρ
Bob
b
ρ
A B
| |
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FIG. 8: Protocol in the entanglement-based representation.
Continuous-variable Bell relay is correctly operated while a
two-mode Gaussian attack is performed against the two quan-
tum links (see text for more details).
The reduced state σE1E2 of E1 and E2 is Gaussian with
zero mean-value and CM in the normal form
VE1E2 =
(
ωAI G
G ωBI
)
,
I := diag(1, 1),
G := diag(g, g′). (23)
Here ωA ≥ 1 is the variance of the thermal noise intro-
duced by E1 in Alice’s link, while ωB ≥ 1 is the variance
of the thermal noise introduced by E2 in Bob’s link. The
correlations between E1 and E2 are determined by the
block G whose elements, g and g′, must satisfy a set of
bona-fide conditions [S6, S7]. Note that the previous nor-
mal form is very general since any two-mode CM can be
put in this form by local Gaussian operations [S1].
For given values of thermal noise ωA, ωB ≥ 1, Eve’s
CM VE1E2 is fully determined by the correlation param-
eters g and g′, which can be represented as a point in
a ‘correlation plane’. To better describe this plane, we
need to write the bona-fide conditions for g and g′, which
are derived by imposing the uncertainty principle [S6]
VE1E2 > 0, ν
2
− ≥ 1, (24)
where ν− is the least symplectic eigenvalue of VE1E2 . In
particular, we have [S1]
2ν2− = ∆−
√
∆2 − 4 detVE1E2 , (25)
where ∆ = ω2A + ω
2
B + 2gg
′.
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The positivity VE1E2 > 0 provides the constraints
|g| < √ωAωB, |g′| < √ωAωB, (26)
while ν2− ≥ 1 provides an inequality f(ωA, ωB, g, g′) ≥ 1
which is symmetric with respect to the origin and the
bisector g′ = −g. On the bisector g′ = −g we have that
f ≥ 1 corresponds to |g′| ≤ φ where
φ := min
{√
(ωA − 1)(ωB + 1),
√
(ωA + 1)(ωB − 1)
}
.
(27)
The previous bona-fide conditions must be satisfied by
g and g′ for any ωA, ωB ≥ 1. They imply that the corre-
lation plane is accessible only in a limited region around
its origin, whose border is determined by ωA and ωB. A
numerical example for ωA = 5 and ωB = 2 is provided in
Fig. 9. The accessible region always forms a continuous
and convex set, apart from the singular case ωA = 1 or
ωB = 1, where it collapses into its origin g
′ = g = 0.
g
g' Separable
En
ta
ng
le
d
En
ta
ng
le
d
FIG. 9: Correlation plane (g, g′) for ωA = 5 and ωB = 2.
Points in the external white area are not accessible (hav-
ing correlations too strong to be compatible with quantum
mechanics). Accessible points (i.e., satisfying the bona-fide
conditions) are represented by the delimited region, which is
further divided in sub-regions. The inner darker area corre-
sponds to separable attacks, while the two peripheral areas
correspond to entangled attacks. The two dashed lines repre-
sent the two bisectors g′ = g and g′ = −g.
The accessible region of the correlation plane can be
further divided into sub-regions, corresponding to attacks
performed with separable or entangled ancillas E1 and
E2. In fact, we can easily write the separability condition
for Eve’s reduced state σE1E2 by considering the least
partially-transposed symplectic eigenvalue ν˜− of its CM
VE1E2 . This positive eigenvalue is determined by
2ν˜2− = ∆˜−
√
∆˜2 − 4 detVE1E2 , (28)
where ∆˜ = ω2A + ω
2
B − 2gg′. Then, we have σE1E2 sepa-
rable if and only if ν˜2− ≥ 1. This corresponds to another
inequality f˜(ωA, ωB, g, g
′) ≥ 1 which is now symmetric
with respect to the origin and the bisector g′ = g. Thus,
within the accessible region, we have an inner area of at-
tacks performed with separable ancillas (ν˜2− ≥ 1), that
we call ‘separable attacks’, and two peripheral areas of
attacks performed with entangled ancillas (ν˜2− < 1), that
we call ‘entangled attacks’ (see Fig. 9).
Among the separable attacks, the simplest one is the
origin of the plane, where Eve’s state is a tensor prod-
uct σE1 ⊗ σE2 . This attack consists of two independent
entangling cloners, i.e., two beam splitters mixing the
travelling modes with two independent thermal modes,
part of two EPR states. Apart from this singular case,
all other separable attacks have correlated noise, with
the two ancillary modes E1 and E2 possessing quantum
correlations (non-zero quantum discord) and possibly en-
tangled with extra ancillas e in the reservoir.
For the entangled attacks, it is essential to distinguish
between the two peripheral regions. For attacks in the
bottom-right region (g > 0 and g′ < 0), Eve injects
‘good’ entanglement. She injects EPR correlations of the
type qˆE1 ≈ qˆE2 and pˆE1 ≈ −pˆE2 , helping the Bell de-
tection (which projects on the same kind of correlations
qˆA′ ≈ qˆB′ and pˆA′ ≈ −pˆB′). We call the ‘positive EPR
attack’ the most entangled attack in this region, which is
the bottom-right point with g = φ and g′ = −φ.
By contrast, for attacks in the top-left region (g < 0
and g′ > 0), Eve injects ‘bad’ entanglement with EPR
correlations of the type qˆE1 ≈ −qˆE2 and pˆE1 ≈ pˆE2 .
These correlations tend to destroy those established by
the Bell detection. In particular, we call the ‘negative
EPR attack’ the most entangled state σE1E2 in this re-
gion, which is the top-left point with g = −φ and g′ = φ.
E. Analytical derivation of the secret-key rate
Having completely characterized the description of the
realistic Gaussian attack against the two links, we can
now derive the corresponding secret-key rate of the pro-
tocol under such an attack. As previously discussed in
Sec. I C, this rate is completely determined by the quan-
tum CM Vab|γ of Alice’s and Bob’s remote modes a and
b after the action of the relay. The first step is therefore
the computation of the post-relay CMVab|γ coming from
the scenario in Fig. 8.
In Sec. I H we explicitly compute
Vab|γ =
(
µI 0
0 µI
)
− (µ2 − 1)×
×


τA
θ 0 −
√
τAτB
θ 0
0 τAθ′ 0
√
τAτB
θ′
−
√
τAτB
θ 0
τB
θ 0
0
√
τAτB
θ′ 0
τB
θ′

 , (29)
where we have set
θ := (τA + τB)µ+ λ, θ
′ := (τA + τB)µ+ λ′, (30)
and the lambdas are defined as
λ := κ− ug > 0, λ′ := κ+ ug′ > 0, (31)
11
with
κ := (1− τA)ωA + (1− τB)ωB, (32)
u := 2
√
(1 − τA)(1 − τB). (33)
In the limit of high modulation µ ≫ 1, the symplectic
spectrum [S1] of Vab|γ takes the asymptotic expressions
{ν1, ν2} =
{
|τA − τB |
τA + τB
µ,
√
λλ′
|τA − τB|
}
for τA 6= τB,
(34)
and
{ν1, ν2} =
{√
λµ
2τB
,
√
λ′µ
2τB
}
for τA = τB . (35)
For the next calculations it is useful to compute the
CMs of Bob’s reduced state ρb|γ and Bob’s state ρb|γα˜
conditioned on Alice’s detection. These CMs can easily
be derived from Vab|γ . In particular, we have
Vb|γ =
(
µ− (µ2−1)τBθ 0
0 µ− (µ2−1)τBθ′
)
, (36)
Vb|γα˜ =
(
µ− (µ2−1)τBτA+τBµ+λ 0
0 µ− (µ2−1)τBτA+τBµ+λ′
)
, (37)
with Vb|γα˜ having the symplectic eigenvalue
ν = τ−1B
√
(τA + λ)(τA + λ′) for µ≫ 1. (38)
1. Alice and Bob’s mutual information
Having determined the post-relay CM, we can now pro-
ceed with the derivation of the rate. First, let us com-
pute the mutual information of Alice and Bob IAB =
I(α˜, β˜|γ). The outcomes α˜ and β˜ of Alice’s and Bob’s
detectors are associated with the classical CM given in
Eq. (17). In particular, Bob’s reduced CM is equal to
VB|γ := V(q˜B , p˜B|γ) = Vb|γ + I. (39)
Then, Bob’s CM conditioned to Alice’s outcome α˜ is
VB|γα˜ := V(q˜B , p˜B|γα˜) = Vb|γα˜ + I. (40)
The previous CMs are all diagonal V = diag(V q, V p).
Since the two quadratures are modulated independently,
the mutual information IAB is given by the sum of the
two terms, one for each quadrature. Explicitly, we have
IAB =
1
2
log2
V qB|γ
V qB|γα˜
+
1
2
log2
V pB|γ
V pB|γα˜
=
1
2
log2Σ, (41)
where
Σ :=
1 + detVb|γ + TrVb|γ
1 + detVb|γα˜ + TrVb|γα˜
. (42)
We can always re-write the mutual information in
terms of a signal-to-noise ratio as
IAB = log2
µ
χ
= log2
ϕ+ 1
χ
, (43)
where the equivalent noise χ = µΣ−1/2 can be computed
from Σ, which in turn depends on the post-relay CM
Vab|γ , known to the parties from the observed statistics
p(a, β|γ). For large modulation µ≫ 1, we derive
χ =
τA + τB
τAτB
√
(τA + τB + λ)(τA + τB + λ′), (44)
where the equivalent noise is expressed in terms of all pa-
rameters of the attack, i.e., χ = χ(τA, τB , ωA, ωB, g, g
′).
2. Eve’s Holevo information
In order to bound Eve’s stolen information on Alice’s
outcome variable α˜, we use the Holevo quantity
IE = S(ρab|γ)− S(ρb|γα˜). (45)
The first entropy term S(ρab|γ) can be computed from
the symplectic spectrum {ν1, ν2} of Vab|γ . In particular,
we have
S(ρab|γ) = h(ν1) + h(ν2), (46)
where the h-function is defined as
h(x) :=
(
x+1
2
)
log2
(
x+1
2
)− (x−12 ) log2 (x−12 ) , (47)
≃ log2
(ex
2
)
+O
(
1
x
)
for x≫ 1. (48)
For large modulation (µ≫ 1), the spectrum {ν1, ν2} is
given by Eqs. (34) and (35). Correspondingly, we derive
the following asymptotic formula for the entropy
S(ρab|γ) =


S 6= for τA 6= τB ,
S= for τA = τB ,
(49)
where
S 6= := h
( √
λλ′
|τA − τB|
)
+ log2
[
e|τA − τB |µ
2(τA + τB)
]
, (50)
S= := log2
(
e2
√
λλ′µ
8τB
)
. (51)
For the second entropy term in Eq. (45), we have
S(ρb|γα˜) = h(ν), where the symplectic eigenvalue ν takes
the asymptotic expression given in Eq. (38).
Here it is important to note that S(ρab|γ) is continuous
in τA = τB. In other words, we have
S 6= → S=, for τA → τB. (52)
This continuity is inherited by the Holevo information IE
in Eq. (45) and by the rate computed in the next section.
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3. Asymptotic secret-key rate
Using the previous formulas for Alice and Bob’s mutual
information and Eve’s Holevo information, we can derive
the secret-key rate of the protocol R = IAB−IE for large
modulation µ ≫ 1. This rate is expressed in terms of
all parameters of the attack R = R(τA, τB, ωA, ωB, g, g
′).
For τA 6= τB, we find
R = h(ν)− h
( √
λλ′
|τA − τB|
)
+ log2
[
2(τA + τB)
e|τA − τB|χ
]
, (53)
with continuous limit in τA = τB := τ , where it becomes
R = h(ν) + log2
(
8τ
e2χ
√
λλ′
)
. (54)
Here the lambda parameters λ and λ′ are given in
Eq. (31), the eigenvalue ν is expressed by Eq. (38), and
the equivalent noise χ is given in Eq. (44).
F. Minimum secret-key rate
The general formula in Eq. (53) is given in terms of all
parameters of the attack τA, τB, ωA, ωB, g, and g
′. While
τA and τB are easily accessible from the first-order mo-
ments, the remaining parameters could be inaccessible to
the parties, since they generally mix in determining the
CM Vab|γ of Eq. (29). For this practical reason, it is im-
portant to express the rate in terms of fewer parameters.
1. Minimization of the rate at fixed thermal noise
Let us start by assuming that Alice and Bob only know
the transmissivities (τA and τB) and the thermal noise
affecting each link (ωA and ωB). Given these four pa-
rameters, we minimize the rate R(τA, τB, ωA, ωB, g, g
′)
of Eq. (53) over all physical values of the correlation pa-
rameters, i.e., over all accessible points in the correlation
plane (g, g′). In our analysis, it is sufficient to assume
τA 6= τB , since we can extend the result to the symmet-
ric configuration τA = τB by continuity.
First it is important to note that the rate R in Eq. (53)
depends on the correlation parameters (g, g′) only via
the lambdas, λ and λ′, specified by Eq. (31). Since R
is invariant under permutation λ ↔ λ′, it is symmetric
with respect to the bisector g′ = −g. This symmetry is
also shown in the numerical example given in Fig. 10.
In the correlation plane, the set of accessible points is
a convex set and symmetric with respect to the bisector
g′ = −g. Combining this topology with the symmetry
of the rate R allows us to restrict its minimization to
the accessible points along the bisector g′ = −g. Setting
g′ = −g corresponds to setting λ′ = λ = κ + ug′ in the
rate of Eq. (53), which gives
R(g′ = −g) = H(τA, τB, λ) + L(τA, τB, λ), (55)
where
H(τA, τB , λ) := h
(
τA + λ
τB
)
− h
(
λ
|τA − τB |
)
, (56)
L(τA, τB , λ) := log2
[
2τAτB
e|τA − τB|(τA + τB + λ)
]
. (57)
It is easy to check that H and L are minimized by
maximizing λ which, in turn, corresponds to maximizing
g′. As we know from Sec. ID, the maximal accessible
value of g′ along the bisector g′ = −g is given by φ in
Eq. (27). Thus, at fixed transmissivities (τA and τB) and
thermal noise (ωA and ωB), the optimal coherent attack
is given by g′ = −g = φ, which is the extremal top-left
point in the accessible region of the correlation plane. As
already discussed in Sec. ID, this entangled attack is a
‘negative EPR attack’ where Eve injects EPR correla-
tions in the links which tend to destroy the effect of the
Bell detection. By contrast, H and L are maximized by
minimizing g′, whose minimum accessible value along the
bisector g′ = −g is given by −φ. Thus, the rate is maxi-
mum in the extremal bottom-right point of the accessible
region, corresponding to the ‘positive EPR attack’, where
Eve injects EPR correlations helping the Bell detection.
Assuming that Eve performs the optimal attack, i.e.,
the negative EPR attack, the minimum rate of our pro-
tocol is equal to
R(τA, τB, ωA, ωB) = h
(
τA + λopt
τB
)
− h
(
λopt
|τA − τB|
)
+ log2
[
2τAτB
e|τA − τB|(τA + τB + λopt)
]
, (58)
where
λopt := κ+ uφ, (59)
with κ and u defined in Eqs. (32) and (33). This rate is
continuous in τA = τB := τ , where it becomes
R(τ, ωA, ωB) = h
(
τ + λopt
τ
)
+log2
[
4τ2
e2(2τ + λopt)λopt
]
.
(60)
As evident from Fig. 10, the negative EPR attack
clearly outperforms the collective entangling-cloner at-
tack (corresponding to the origin of the plane g′ = g = 0).
From this point of view, the security analysis of our pro-
tocol is clearly more complex compared to previous lit-
erature on continuous-variable quantum cryptography.
2. Minimization of the rate at fixed equivalent noise
Despite the complexity of the protocol, it is remarkable
that we can further simplify its rate by expressing it in
terms of three parameters only. In fact, suppose that Al-
ice and Bob only access the values of the transmissivities
(τA and τB) and the equivalent noise χ. This minimal
knowledge on the attack is always guaranteed. In fact, as
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FIG. 10: Minimization at fixed thermal noise. The gen-
eral rate R of Eq. (53) is plotted in the correlation plane
(g, g′) for τA = 0.9, τB = 0.5, and ωA = ωB = 2.5. The
non-white area is the set of accessible points, which is convex
and symmetric with respect to the bisector g′ = −g. Within
the accessible set, darker regions correspond to lower values
of the rate. The rate is symmetric with respect to the bi-
sector g′ = −g, and decreasing towards the extremal top-left
point of the accessible set (behavior is generic for any choice
of the parameters τA, τB, ωA and ωB). Mnimization at
fixed equivalent noise. We compare the iso-noise curves
(χ=const) with the more concave iso-rate curves (R=const).
discussed in Sec. I E and specifically regarding Eq. (43),
we have that the equivalent noise is uniquely determined
by the post-relay CM Vab|γ which is, in turn, recon-
structed from the empirical statistics p(α, β|γ). Thus,
given the three accessible parameters τA, τB and χ, we
minimize the general rate R of Eq. (53), finding a simple
formula for the minimum rate R(τA, τB , χ).
For this constrained minimization we can construct a
Lagrangian and look for its critical points (procedure is
involved and not reported here). More intuitively, we can
find the minimum by directly comparing the rate and
the equivalent noise on the correlation plane. On this
plane, we plot the curves with the same rate R=const
(iso-rate curves) and the curves with the same equivalent
noise χ=const (iso-noise curves). As we can see from the
numerical example in Fig. 10, the iso-rate curves are more
concave than the iso-noise curves.
Combining this different concavity with the fact that
the rate is decreasing from the bottom-right point to the
top-left point of the accessible region, we find that the
rate is minimized at the intersection of each iso-noise
curve with the bisector g′ = −g. In other words, moving
along an iso-noise curve (χ=const) the rate is minimized
at the point where g′ = −g. Therefore we set g′ = −g in
the rate R(τA, τB , ωA, ωB, g, g
′) and we express the result
in terms of the three basic parameters τA, τB and χ.
Given these parameters the minimum rate is equal to
R(τA, τB , χ) = h
(
τAχ
τA+τB
− 1
)
− h
[
τAτBχ−(τA+τB)2
|τA−τB|(τA+τB)
]
+ log2
[
2(τA + τB)
e|τA − τB|χ
]
, (61)
which is continuous in τA = τB , where it becomes
R(χ) = h
(χ
2
− 1
)
+ log2
[
16
e2χ(χ− 4)
]
. (62)
These latter two formulas represent our main theoretical
result and coincide with Eqs. (2) and (3) of the main
text.
We can always decompose the equivalent noise as
χ = χloss(τA, τB) + ε, (63)
where
χloss(τA, τB) := χ|ωA=ωB=1 =
2(τA + τB)
τAτB
(64)
is that part of the noise due to loss only, with the ex-
tra part ε known as the ‘excess noise’. Adopting this
decomposition of the noise, the rate of Eq. (61) can be
re-written as R = R(τA, τB , ε).
For the specific case ε = 0, we have a pure-loss attack
of the links, where Eve’s beam splitters mix the incoming
modes with vacuum modes. The study of this simple
attack is useful to estimate the maximum performance of
the protocol (which clearly worsens for ε > 0). In a pure-
loss attack, the minimum rate R(τA, τB, 0) simplifies to
R(τA, τB) = h
(
2− τB
τB
)
− h
(
2− τA − τB
|τA − τB|
)
+ log2
(
τAτB
e|τA − τB|
)
, (65)
which is continuous in τA = τB := τ , where it becomes
R(τ) = h
(
2− τ
τ
)
+ log2
[
τ2
e2(1 − τ)
]
. (66)
One can easily check that Eq. (65) can also be achieved
by specifying the previous rates of Eqs. (53) and (58) to
the specific case of pure-loss (ωA = ωB = 1).
In the top panel of Fig. 11, we have plotted R(τA, τB)
as a function of the two transmissivities. We see that
R > 0 occurs above a certain threshold which is asym-
metric in the plane. In particular, for τA close to 1 we
see that τB can be close to zero, identifying the optimal
configuration of the protocol. Assuming standard optical
fibres (0.2dB/km), this corresponds to having Alice close
to the relay while Bob can be very far away as also shown
in Fig. 4 in the main text. These results are proven to be
robust with respect to the presence of excess noise ε > 0.
This can be seen in the bottom panel of Fig. 11, where
we plot R(τA, τB , ε) for the high numerical value ε = 0.1.
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FIG. 11: Secret-key rate R (bits per relay use) as a function
of the two transmissivities τA and τB. (Top) Rate R(τA, τB)
for a pure-loss attack (ε = 0). (Bottom) Rate R(τA, τB, ε) for
a coherent Gaussian attack with excess noise ε = 0.1.
G. Minimum rate in limit configurations
According to Fig. 11, the most interesting scenario is
when the protocol is implemented in an asymmetric fash-
ion with small loss in Alice’s link (τA ≃ 1). Therefore, let
us analyze what happens in the limit for τA → 1. Assum-
ing a fixed loss rate (e.g., 0.2dB/km), this corresponds to
Alice approaching the relay (note that even if the Alice-
relay distance becomes negligible, the relay must still be
considered as a different device which is potentially op-
erated by Eve). Taking the limit τA → 1 in Eq. (61), we
find
RτA→1 = h
[
1 + (1− τB)ωB
τB
]
− h(ωB) (67)
+ log2
{
2τB
e(1− τB)[1 + τB + (1− τB)ωB]
}
.
This is a function of τB and ωB only, as expected since
the coherent Gaussian attack collapses into an entangling
cloner attack affecting Bob’s link only (with transmissiv-
ity τB and thermal noise ωB).
It is important to note that the rate of Eq. (67) is
identical to the reverse-reconcilation rate of a point-to-
point ‘no-switching’ protocol from Alice to Bob which is
based on random coherent states and heterodyne detec-
tion [S8] (see the Supplementary Information of Ref. [S9]
for checking the asymptotic analytical expression of this
rate). It is remarkable that the security performance of
such a powerful protocol can be realized in the absence
of a direct link between Alice and Bob by exploiting the
intermediation of an untrusted relay in the proximity of
Alice, i.e., the encoder of the secret information. Thanks
to the equivalence with reverse reconciliation, we can
achieve remarkably long distances for Bob. Ideally, if
Bob’s link were affected by pure loss only (ωB = 1), then
we would have
RlossτA→1 = h
(
2− τB
τB
)
+ log2
[
τB
e(1− τB)
]
, (68)
which goes to zero only for τB → 0, corresponding to
Bob being arbitrarily far from the relay.
We can also explain why the other asymmetric con-
figuration with τB ≃ 1 is not particularly profitable (at
fixed loss rate this corresponds to Bob approaching the
relay). Taking the limit τB → 1 in Eq. (61), we find
RτB→1 = h [τA + (1− τA)ωA]− h(ωA) (69)
+ log2
{
2τA
e(1− τA)[1 + τA + (1 − τA)ωA]
}
,
which depends on τA and ωA only, as expected, since the
attack must reduce to an entangling cloner attack versus
Alice’s link. Here it is important to note that Eq. (69) co-
incides with the direct-reconciliation rate of the point-to-
point no-switching protocol [S8] (whose asymptotic an-
alytical expression can be found in the Supplementary
Information of Ref. [S9]). As we know this rate has a
limited range. For instance, in the presence of pure loss
(ωA = 1), we have
RlossτB→1 = log2
[
τA
e(1− τA)
]
, (70)
which is zero at τA ≃ 0.73, therefore limiting Alice’s dis-
tance from the relay to about 6.8km in standard optical
fibres (0.2dB/km).
It is clear that the symmetric configuration τA = τB :=
τ has a performance which must be somehow intermedi-
ate between the previous limit cases. More precisely the
performance of the symmetric configuration is compara-
ble with that of Bob approaching the relay. In fact, for
pure-loss attacks (ωA = ωB = 1), we have the rate in
Eq. (66), which goes to zero for τ ≃ 0.84, therefore re-
stricting Alice’s and Bob’s distances from the relay to
about 3.8km in optical fibres (0.2dB/km). This means
that the overall distance between Alice and Bob cannot
exceed 7.6km when the relay is perfectly in the middle.
Finally, it is interesting to note how the Bell detection
reverses the role of the two types of reconciliations. In
fact, suppose to have an EPR source very close to Al-
ice, who heterodynes one mode in order to encode the
signal variable in the other mode being sent to Bob who
is far away. In this scheme, Bob guessing Alice corre-
sponds to direct reconciliation. If we now replace the
EPR source with a relay performing a Bell detection on
incoming modes, the situation is reversed and Bob guess-
ing Alice becomes equivalent to reverse reconciliation.
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H. Computation of the post-relay CM
In this technical section we explicitly compute the for-
mula of Eq. (29) for the post-relay CM Vab|γ corre-
sponding to the scenario depicted in Fig. 8. At the in-
put, Alice’s modes a and A, Bob’s modes b and B, and
Eve’s modes E1 and E2 are in a tensor-product state
ρaA⊗ρbB⊗σE1E2 , where ρaA = ρbB = ρ is an EPR state
with CM
V(µ) =
(
µI µ′Z
µ′Z µI
)
,
µ′ :=
√
µ2 − 1,
Z := diag(1,−1), (71)
and σE1E2 is Eve’s zero-mean Gaussian state with CM
VE1E2 in the normal form of Eq. (23). The global state
is then a zero-mean Gaussian state with CM
VaAbBE1E2 = V(µ) ⊕V(µ) ⊕VE1E2 . (72)
It is helpful to permute the modes so as to have the or-
dering abAE1E2B, where the upper-case modes are those
transformed by the beam splitters. After reordering, the
input CM has the explicit form
VabAE1E2B =


µI 0 µ′Z 0 0 0
0 µI 0 0 0 µ′Z
µ′Z 0 µI 0 0 0
0 0 0 ωAI G 0
0 0 0 G ωBI 0
0 µ′Z 0 0 0 µI

 ,
(73)
where 0 is the 2 × 2 zero matrix. Now the action of
the two beam splitters with transmissivities τA and τB is
described by the symplectic matrix
S = I⊕ I⊕ S(τA)⊕ S(τB)T , (74)
where the identity matrices I⊕I act on the remote modes
a and b, the beam splitter matrix
S(τA) =
( √
τAI
√
1− τAI
−√1− τAI √τAI
)
(75)
acts on modes A and E1, and the transposed beam split-
ter matrix S(τB)
T acts on modes E2 and B.
The state describing the output modes abA′E′1E
′
2B
′
after the beam splitters is a Gaussian state with zero
mean and CM equal to
VabA′E′
1
E′
2
B′ = S VabAE1E2B S
T . (76)
After some algebra, we get
VabA′E′
1
E′
2
B′ =

 Vab W1 W2WT1 VA′E′1 W3
WT2 W
T
3 VE′2B′

 , (77)
where the blocks along the diagonal correspond to the
reduced CMs Vab = µ(I⊕ I),
VA′E′
1
=
(
xAI x
′′
AI
x′′AI x
′
AI
)
, VE′
2
B′ =
(
x′BI x
′′
BI
x′′BI xBI
)
, (78)
where we have set (for k = A,B)
xk := τkµ+ (1− τk)ωk, (79)
x′k := τkωk + (1− τk)µ, (80)
x′′k :=
√
τk(1− τk)(ωk − µ). (81)
The off-diagonal blocks are given by
W1 =
(
µ′
√
τAZ −µ′
√
1− τAZ
0 0
)
, (82)
W2 =
(
0 0
−µ′√1− τBZ µ′√τBZ
)
, (83)
and
W3 =
( √
(1− τA)τBG
√
(1− τA)(1− τB)G√
τAτBG
√
τA(1− τB)G
)
.
(84)
Since we are interested in the output CM of Alice and
Bob, we trace out E′1 and E
′
2, which corresponds to delet-
ing the corresponding rows and columns in the CM of
Eq. (77). As a result, we get the following reduced CM
for modes abA′B′
VabA′B′ =

 Vab C1 C2CT1 A D
CT2 D
T B

 , (85)
where the various blocks are given by
A = xAI, B = xBI, (86)
D =
√
(1− τA)(1− τB)G, (87)
and
C1 =
(
µ′
√
τAZ
0
)
, C2 =
(
0
µ′
√
τBZ
)
. (88)
From the CM of Eq. (85) we derive the CM Vab|γ of
the conditional remote state ρab|γ after the Bell measure-
ment on modes A′ and B′. For this derivation, we use
the transformation rules for CMs under Bell-like mea-
surements given in Ref. [S5]. From the blocks of the
CM (85), we construct the following theta matrix
Θ :=
1
2
(
ZAZ+B− ZD−DTZ) . (89)
After some simple algebra, we find
Θ =
1
2
(
θ 0
0 θ′
)
, (90)
whose diagonal elements are given in Eq. (30).
Then the conditional CM is given by the formula [S5]
Vab|γ = Vab −
1
2 detΘ
2∑
i,j=1
Ci(X
T
i ΘXj)C
T
j , (91)
where
X1 :=
(
0 1
1 0
)
, X2 :=
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (92)
After some algebra, we find the expression in Eq. (29).
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II. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
In this section we start by providing a general descrip-
tion of the experimental setup, discussing the main opti-
cal elements involved in the implementation (Sec. II A).
Then, in Sec. II B, we give a more detailed mathemati-
cal interpretation of the experiment, and we discuss the
data post-processing together with the finite-size effects
associated with the protocol.
A. General description of the optical setup
In our proof-of-principle experiment we used a highly
stable laser at 1064nmwhich is split in equal portions and
directed to the stations of Alice and Bob, providing them
with a common local oscillator. In a future in-field im-
plementation of the protocol, such a phase-locking of the
beams can be achieved by atom-clock syncronization and
classical communication between the parties. In general,
the local oscillator could even be provided by the eaves-
dropper since does not contain any information about the
encodings of Alice and Bob. Furthermore, it can be con-
tinuously monitored by the parties and suitably filtered
to delete the presence of additional degrees of freedom
(side-channel attacks [S10]).
At each of the stations (see Fig. 12), the laser beams
are modulated using amplitude and phase electro-optical
modulators that are fed by Gaussian modulated sig-
nals from independent electronic signal generators. The
Gaussian modulations are white within the measurement
bandwidth. Prior to modulation, the laser fields were
polarized to a very high degree to ensure pure amplitude
(phase) modulation produced by the amplitude (phase)
modulator. Furthermore, the transverse profiles of the
laser beams were made as large as possible in the mod-
ulator to ensure preservation of their Gaussian profiles.
At the relay, the two beams interfere at a balanced
beam splitter with a visibility of 96% and their relative
phase is actively controlled with a piezo mounted mirror
to produce equally intense output beams. These beams
are focused onto two balanced detectors and the result-
ing currents are subtracted and added in order to produce
the difference of the amplitude quadratures and the sum
of the phase quadratures, respectively. This method is
a simple alternative to the standard eight-port measure-
ment setup needed for the continuous-variable Bell detec-
tion and is enabled by the brightness of the carrier [S11].
As the subtraction and addition processes are performed
in a software program, an imbalanced hardware-system
can be compensated during the post-processing (See the
next section for more details).
The measurements are carried out at the sideband fre-
quency of 10.5MHz which is well separated from the car-
rier frequency thereby avoiding low frequency noise and
thus ensuring quantum noise limited performance of the
protocol. The power of the individual laser beams was
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FIG. 12: Experimental setup (same as Fig. 5 in the main
text). Alice and Bob apply amplitude and phase modula-
tors to a pair of identical classical phase-locked bright co-
herent beams, providing a common local oscillator and com-
ing from a highly stable laser (not shown). At the output,
the two modes emerge randomly-displaced in the phase space
according to a Gaussian distribution. In particular, Bob’s
modulation is suitably attenuated to simulate loss in his link.
Bob’s mode is then phase-shifted and merged with Alice’s
mode at the relay’s balanced beam splitter. The two output
ports are photodetected and processed to realize an equivalent
continuous-variable Bell measurement.
1.4mW. The signal is mixed down to DC from 10.5MHz,
low pass filtered at 100kHz and digitized with a sampling
rate of 500kHz and 14bit resolution. Each data block con-
sists of 106 data points corresponding to a measurement
time of 2 seconds.
The modulation depth in Bob’s link was reduced to
simulate the transmission loss. A reduction in modu-
lation is equivalent to a beam splitter induced transmis-
sion loss because both reduce the power in the sidebands.
The difference is that a reduction in modulation depth
keeps the power of the carrier (with respect to the side-
bands) laser beam constant, which was experimentally
convenient. This allows us to accurately simulate the
transmission through the channels and thus test differ-
ent communication realizations (see the next section for
more details on this method).
B. Detailed mathematical description of the
experiment and data post-processing
Consider the schematic of Fig. 12. The two input clas-
sical beams are identical and phase-locked, each provid-
ing a bright coherent state with amplitude iL (L ≫ 1).
Note that we have complete freedom in choosing the
global phase of this oscillator, which is here set to pi just
for convenience of notation.
At the output of the modulators, Alice’s and Bob’s
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annihilation operators can be written as Aˆ = iL + aˆ
and Bˆ = iL + bˆ, respectively. Before entering the sec-
ond balanced beam splitter at the relay, Bob’s mode is
phase-shifted by pi/2, so that the two output ports have
roughly the same intensity. This is equivalent to trans-
form Alice’s mode as Aˆ → iAˆ (since this is a relative
shift, it can be mathematically applied to Alice or Bob).
The output ports of the beam splitter are then described
by the following annihilation operators
Dˆ0 =
iAˆ+ Bˆ√
2
, Dˆ1 =
iAˆ− Bˆ√
2
. (93)
Each output port (k = 0, 1) is measured by a photode-
tector with photocurrent ik = ckNˆk, where Nˆk = Dˆ
†
kDˆk
is the number operator, and ck is an optical-to-current
conversion factor. This factor is different for the two de-
tectors, so that they have different levels of electronic
shot-noise. To counterbalance this asymmetry, we can
re-scale one of the currents by a real factor g. Thus, by
re-scaling the currents and taking their sum and differ-
ence, we get
Σ± := i0 ± g i1 = c0
(
Nˆ0 ± rNˆ1
)
, (94)
where r := gc1/c0. By expanding at the first order in the
local oscillator L, we derive
Σ+
c0
= (1 + r)L2 +
L
2
[(1− r)qˆ− + (1 + r)pˆ+] , (95)
Σ−
c0
= (1− r)L2 + L
2
[(1 + r)qˆ− + (1 − r)pˆ+] . (96)
The next step is subtracting the offset of the local oscil-
lator which is equivalent to subtracting the mean values
〈Σ±〉 = c0(1 ± r)L2. The result is normalized dividing
by the standard deviation of the vacuum fluctuations
σ± =
√〈
Σ2±
〉
vac
− 〈Σ±〉2vac = c0L
√
1 + r2
2
. (97)
Thus, we get
Σ+ − 〈Σ+〉
σ+
= xˆ+r,
Σ− − 〈Σ−〉
σ−
= xˆ−r, (98)
where
xˆ+r := κ1qˆ− + κ2pˆ+ (99)
is a linear combination qˆ− and pˆ+, with coefficients
κ1 =
1− r√
2(1 + r2)
, κ2 =
1 + r√
2(1 + r2)
. (100)
We can rewrite the linear combination of Eq. (99) as
xˆ+r =
1− r
1 + r
κ2qˆ− + κ2pˆ+, (101)
and include the factor κ2 in Alice’s and Bob’s classical
modulations. In fact, the quantum variables can always
be decomposed as
qˆ− = q− + qˆvac− , pˆ+ = p+ + pˆ
vac
+ , (102)
where q− and p+ are the classical parts, with qˆvac− and
pˆvac+ accounting for vacuum noise. Then, we can write
xˆ+r =
1− r
1 + r
q− + p+ + δˆvac+ , (103)
where δˆvac+ is vacuum noise and the classical variables
have been re-scaled as
κ2q− → q−, κ2p+ → p+. (104)
This is equivalent to re-scaling Alice’s and Bob’s classical
variables
κ2


qA
pA
qB
pB

→


qA
pA
qB
pB

 , (105)
so that their new variables are Gaussianly-modulated
with a re-scaled variance κ22ϕ → ϕ. Similarly to
Eq. (103), we derive
xˆ−r = q− +
1− r
1 + r
p+ + δˆ
vac
− . (106)
Thus, the outcome of the relay is generally given by the
pair (x−r, x+r) or equivalently γr := (x−r + ix+r)/
√
2,
where r is a parameter which can be optimized. Note
that, for r = 1, we have xˆ+1 = pˆ+ and xˆ−1 = qˆ−. In
general, for the presence of quadrature asymmetries and
q-p correlations (coming from the cross-talk between the
amplitude and phase modulators), the optimal value of r
may be different from 1, e.g., in the range 0.45÷ 0.75 in
our experiment. This optimization is a simple operation
which enables us to counterbalance some of the technical
imperfections in our setup. Similar optimizations could
also be exploited in potential in-field implementations of
the protocol (given an observed statistics, Alice and Bob
can always assume an optimized relay and ascribe all the
noise to the coherent attack of the links.)
In order to use Eqs. (103) and (106), we need to ac-
cess the experimental values of Alice’s and Bob’s opti-
cal displacements (qA, pA, qB, pB)
T . Therefore we have
to compute the electro-optical gains of the modulators,
for both amplitude and phase (i.e., position and mo-
mentum on top of the bright local oscillator). These
gains {t1, t2, t3, t4} convert the applied electronic dis-
placements {Aq,Bq,Ap,Bp} into the optical quadrature
displacements. For their computation, we minimize the
following variances〈[
xˆ−r − t1Aq − t2Bq√
2
]2〉
, (107)
〈[
xˆ+r − t3Ap + t4Bp√
2
]2〉
. (108)
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Once these gains are known, we can experimentally de-
termine the optical displacements of Alice and Bob as
qA = t1Aq, qB = t2Bq, (109)
pA = t3Ap, pB = t4Bp. (110)
The classical modulations in the optical quadratures
are approximately equal, with a maximal variance of
ϕ ≃ 65 vacuum-noise units. In order to simulate beam
splitters in the links, we equivalently attenuate the clas-
sical modulations ϕA = V (qA) ≃ V (pA) and ϕB =
V (qB) ≃ V (pB). In fact, an ensemble of Gaussian-
modulated coherent states is described by an average
state which is thermal with quantum variance µ = ϕ+1,
where ϕ is the classical modulation and 1 is the variance
of the vacuum noise. By sending a thermal state with
such a variance through a beam splitter with transmis-
sivity τ (in a vacuum environment), we get the output
variance
V = τ(ϕ+ 1) + 1− τ = τϕ + 1. (111)
This is equivalent to removing the beam splitter and
sending a thermal state with quantum variance τϕ + 1,
i.e., Gaussian-modulated coherent states with a reduced
modulation τϕ.
Thus, Bob’s modulation is taken to be ϕB = τBϕ with
τB being the equivalent transmissivity of the beam split-
ter. We have considered several values of τB down to
about 4×10−4, corresponding to 34dB loss (equivalent to
170km in optical fibre at 0.2dB/km). Alice’s modulation
is fixed to be maximal ϕA ≃ ϕ, simulating the scenario
where Alice’s link has τA ≃ 1 (small effects due to non-
unit quantum efficiencies of the detectors and non-unit
beam splitter visibility have been neglected by suitably
re-scaling Alice’s modulation). Note that, in a future
real-time implementation of the protocol, Alice’s trans-
missivity can indeed be very close to 1 by using photodi-
odes with high quantum efficiencies (∼98%).
Thus, in our experiment we realize the conditions
xˆ−r ≃ qA −
√
τBqB√
2
+
1− r
1 + r
pA +
√
τBpB√
2
+ δˆvac− , (112)
xˆ+r ≃ 1− r
1 + r
qA −√τBqB√
2
+
pA +
√
τBpB√
2
+ δˆvac+ , (113)
which connect Alice’s amplitude α := (qA+ipA)/2, Bob’s
amplitude β := (qB + ipB)/2, and the relay outcome
γr := (x−r + ix+r)/
√
2 under a pure-loss attack of Bob’s
link. One can easily check that, for r = 1, the previous
Eqs. (112) and (113) become
qˆ− ≃
qA −√τBqB√
2
+ δˆvac− , (114)
pˆ+ ≃
pA +
√
τBpB√
2
+ δˆvac+ . (115)
For any experimental value of τB, we have considered
an optimized relay (with optimal r published) and col-
lected 106 values of α, β and γr. The value of τB is acces-
sible to Alice and Bob by computing and comparing the
first moments of their data which must follow Eqs. (112)
and (113). Their estimate is in good agreement with
the applied attenuation. The parties can also derive the
global classical CM V(qA, pA, qB , pB, x−r, x+r) by com-
paring a subset of their data. Once this is known, they
can derive the secret key rate of the protocol.
Before proceeding, let us first discuss the experimen-
tal finite-size effects involved in the estimate of the first-
and second-order moments. As we can see from Fig. 13,
the asymptotic values of the statistical moments are al-
ready reached after ≃ 105 rounds of the protocol (for the
second-order moments we have plotted the scaled deter-
minant of the global CM, i.e., detVn/ detV∞, where n
is the variable number of rounds and ∞ = 106). Thus,
the parties rapidly reach the asymptotic regime, where
the finite-size effects on the key rate can be neglected (see
again Fig. 13 for the rate). Thus the parties just need to
compare≃ 105 points in order to estimate the asymptotic
values of the statistical moments. Clearly, this represents
a negligible subset of data in a real-time implementation
of the protocol where the number of rounds can be≫ 105
(e.g., > 109 in Ref. [S12]).
Number of rounds
(a)
(b)
(c)
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FIG. 13: As the number of rounds of the protocol increases up
to 106, we plot Alice and Bob’s estimate of the transmissivity
τB (a), the estimate of the scaled determinant of the global
CM V (b) and the estimate of the key rate of the protocol
(c). Asymptotic values are quickly reached after about 105
experimental points. This behaviour is generic in r (here we
have chosen r = 1) and for the various experimental points
(here we have chosen τB ≃ 0.77).
Let us now derive the experimental key rate from
the global CM V(qA, pA, qB, pB, x−r, x+r). The first
step is to perform the Gaussian elimination of the re-
lay variables in order to construct the conditional CM
Vcond := V(qA, pA, qB, pB|γr) according to Eqs. (13)
and (14). This conditional matrix has still some asym-
metries in the quadratures plus residual q-p correlations.
These imperfections can be counterbalanced by Alice and
Bob by performing local rotations and re-scalings of their
classical data α and β. By means of these local sym-
plectic transformations, the conditional matrix is trans-
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formed into a normal form
Vcond =
(
A C
CT B
)
→
(
aI cZ
cZ bI
)
, (116)
where a =
√
detA, b =
√
detB and c is determined by
computing the other two symplectic invariants detV and
detA+ detB+ 2detC.
Once Alice and Bob have symmetrized the conditional
CM, they derive the quantum CM Vab|γr in the equiv-
alent entanglement-based representation of the protocol.
According to Eq. (16) and (17), this is given by
Vab|γr = η
2Vcond − I, (117)
where η is the parameter of Eq. (5) and accounts for the
finite modulation (η ≃ 1.01 in the experiment, where
η = 1 is the asymptotic regime of infinite modulation).
From Vab|γr we can easily extract the reduced CM
Vb|γr and compute the doubly-conditional CMVb|γrα˜ via
Eq. (19) or (20). These matrices provide Alice and Bob’s
mutual information IAB according to Eqs. (41) and (42).
Then, we compute Eve’s Holevo information IE using
Eq. (45), where the entropies of ρab|γr and ρb|γrα˜ are com-
puted from the symplectic spectra of Vab|γr and Vb|γrα˜,
respectively. Finally, we can derive the experimental rate
R = ξIAB − IE , (118)
where ξ is the reconciliation efficiency, with ideal value
ξ = 1 and current achievable value of ξ ≃ 97% [S13].
The corresponding rates are plotted in the main text and
compared with the theoretical curves. According to these
final results, our adjustment of the experimental imper-
fections is not perfect, with some residual noise affecting
our data. Such noise affects the rate in the same way as
a coherent Gaussian attack with excess noise ε . 0.02.
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